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Abstract
The purpose of this Comment is to point out that the discrete logarithm based
signature with message recovery scheme proposed by Chen in [1] is actually not a sig-
nature scheme. It would more accurately be described as an authenticated encryption
scheme.
Comments
Chen's scheme [1] is based on the discrete logarithms problem and is claimed to com-
bine the same eciency as Horster-Michels-Petersen and Lee-Chang [2, 3], with a simpler
specication. In addition to a level of message authentication, Chen's scheme also pro-
vides message encryption, although this is only apparent from the detailed specication
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of the scheme. However, the scheme is not a signature scheme in the normal sense of the
term, contrary to the claim in [1].
In a signature with message recovery scheme, see for example [4], the Trusted Third
Party (TTP) can always verify the signatures which are sent by the receiver B without B
having to divulge any long term secret information to the TTP. However, in the authen-
ticated encryption schemes described in [2, 3], only the sender A and the receiver B can
verify a protected message sent from A to B. This is because B can only verify such a
message with the aid of his private decryption key. It is for this reason that the authors of
both [2] and [3] have been careful to call their schemes authenticated encryption schemes
rather than combined signature/encryption schemes, although nowhere is this point made
explicit in [2] or [3].
In order to verify a signature generated using the scheme proposed by Chen, the
receiver B needs to use his private key. It is straightforward to verify that a third party
cannot verify the `signature' (r; s) unless B is prepared to divulge his private key. This
holds even if B is prepared to supply the recovered plaintext message m and both A's
and B's public keys, in addition to the received signature.
This is an unacceptable property for a true signature scheme, where one would nor-
mally expect signature verication to be possible without compromise of any private keys.
Thus it would be more appropriate to refer to the scheme as an authenticated encryption
scheme, analogously to the terminology used in [2, 3]. Finally note that similar remarks
have been made in [5] regarding schemes recently proposed by Zheng.
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